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INTRODUCTION
Data breaches are an increasingly common occurrence and a
growing social issue. Several large corporations were hit with, or
settled, large lawsuits related to data breaches, including Home Depot
and Lamps Plus, Inc., in March 2016 alone. On March 8, 2016, Home
Depot agreed to settle consumers’ class action claims from a 2014 data
breach for $13 million, in addition to funding identity protection
services and implementing new data security measures. 1 Lamps Plus,
Inc., was sued on March 29 for failure to protect the information of an
estimated 1,300 workers following a recent target by hackers who
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1
Allison Grande, Home Depot to Pay $13M to End Consumers’ Breach
Claims, LAW360 (April 16, 2016),
http://www.law360.com/classaction/articles/768679?nl_pk=4123bead-428e-49d089dbace96bab2b1c&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=
classaction.
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allegedly stole employee IRS information. 2 As of April 26, 2016, there
have been 315 data breaches in the United States, affecting over 11.3
million records. 3
In July 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
addressed Article III standing of consumers who were harmed by a
data breach. 4 In that case, customers brought a lawsuit against Neiman
Marcus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
alleging present injuries and increased risk of future harm following a
2013 data breach by hackers. 5 Plaintiffs alleged present injuries
including loss of time and money related to resolving fraudulent
charges and protecting against future risks, financial losses for
purchases plaintiffs would not have otherwise made, and loss of
control over private information. 6
The district court held that the Plaintiffs did not adequately allege
injury sufficient to establish Article III standing and granted
Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing. 7 While the district
court found that the threat of future harm was imminent, the injuries
inflicted by unauthorized credit card charges did not “qualify as
‘concrete’ injuries.” 8 The complaint did not contain allegations
regarding the costs incurred to mitigate the risk of future fraudulent
charges, and the court noted that the general responses to a fraudulent
charge, including issuance of a new credit card and possibly a period

2

Kurt Orzeck, Lamps Plus Hit With Employee Class Action Data Breach,
LAW360, (April 28, 2016),
http://www.law360.com/classaction/articles/777931?nl_pk=4123bead-428e-49d089db-ace96bab2b1c&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign
=classaction.
3
Data Breach Reports, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, at 4 (May 24,
2016), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/DataBreachReports_2016.pdf.
4
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015).
5
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, No. 14 C 1735, 2014 WL 4627893, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2014), rev’d and remanded, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015).
6
Id.
7
Id. at *1, *5.
8
Id. at *3.
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of time where one has to wait for the new card, are de minimis injuries
and ultimately insufficient to confer standing. 9
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision. 10 The Seventh Circuit considered the injuries Plaintiffs
alleged and found that the Supreme Court’s holding in Clapper did not
“foreclose any use whatsoever of future injuries to support Article III
standing.” 11 Citing to a district court case with similar facts where the
court found Article III standing, 12 the Remijas court held that injuries
associated with resolving fraudulent charges and protecting oneself
against identity theft were sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact
requirement for Article III standing. 13 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held
that the Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were sufficient to establish
standing. 14
Part I of this article discusses data breaches and their costs to
society. Part II provides a summary of Article III standing doctrine at
the Supreme Court more generally and at the federal appellate court
level in cases involving data breaches. Part III reviews the factual and
procedural context of Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, as well
as the district court and Seventh Circuit holdings. Finally, Part IV
argues that the Seventh Circuit’s finding of Article III standing is
proper and consistent with approaches both by the Supreme Court and
those adopted by other federal courts of appeal.
WHAT IS A DATA BREACH?
According to the Congressional Research Service, “[a] data
security breach occurs when there is a loss or theft of, or unauthorized
access to, sensitive personally identifiable information that could
result in the potential compromise of the confidentiality or integrity of
9

Id. at *4.
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2015).
11
Id. at 693.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 696.
14
Id. at 697.
10
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data.” 15 Data breach causes include: “computer hacking, malware,
payment card fraud, employee insider breach, physical loss of nonelectronic records and portable devices, and inadvertent exposure of
confidential data on websites or in e-mail.” 16 The most frequent cause
of data breaches is malicious or criminal attack, accounting for 47% of
data breaches globally in FY 2015. 17
Data breach costs also continue to increase. 18 According to the
Ponemon Institute, a research center dedicated to privacy and data
protection, the average per capita cost of data breaches in the United
States in FY 2015 was $217, the highest in the world, which was an
increase from $207 in FY 2014 and $188 in FY 2013. 19 The average
total organizational cost of data breaches in FY 2015 was $6.5 million,
an increase of over $1 million since FY 2013. 20 The Institute
calculates data breach costs from both direct and indirect expenses.
“Direct expenses include engaging forensic experts, outsourcing
hotline support and providing free credit monitoring subscriptions and
discounts for future products and services. Indirect costs include inhouse investigations and communication, as well as the extrapolated
value of customer loss resulting from turnover or diminished customer
acquisition rates.” 21
In 2013, the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing,
and Trade held a hearing on data breaches, entitled “Reporting Data

15

GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42475, DATA SECURITY BREACH
NOTIFICATION LAWS 2 (2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42475.pdf.
16
Id.
17
2015 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis, PONEMON INST., 10 (May
2015). Malicious and criminal attacks account for negligent insiders, individuals
who cause a breach because of carelessness, and malicious attacks caused by hackers
or criminal insiders, attacks include malware infections, criminal insiders,
phishing/social engineering, and SQL injection. Id.
18
Id. at 10.
19
Id. at 2–5.
20
Id. at 7.
21
Id. at 4.
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Breaches: Is Federal Legislation Needed to Protect Consumers?” 22
During the hearing, Representatives heard about data breach trends
and the need for federal legislation to protect consumers. 23 There
currently exists a patchwork of state laws with no federally mandated
notification regime, costing businesses more than an estimated $100
billion to comply. 24
Given the costs and frequency of data breaches, millions of
Americans are at risk of having their personal information stolen. The
question becomes, once a person’s personal information is
compromised in a data breach, does the victim have any legal
recourse? Varying judicial interpretation of Article III Section 2 Clause
1 of the U.S. Constitution provides an unclear answer to this question,
as without Article III standing, data breach victims cannot have their
claims heard in federal court.
ARTICLE III STANDING
Article III Section 2 Clause 1 outlines the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts. 25 Article III’s case-or-controversy doctrines, including
standing, mootness, ripeness, and political question, concern “the
constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected,
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.” 26 The Supreme
Court has set forth that Article III standing is arguably the “most
important” of the case-or-controversy doctrines. 27 “[S]tanding is an
essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement
22

Press Release, The Energy and Commerce Committee,
Subcommittee Explores State of Data Breaches in United States (July, 18
2013), https://energycommerce.house.gov/news-center/pressreleases/subcommittee-explores-state-data-breaches-united-states.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
U.S. CONST. art. III.
26
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Vander Jagt v. O’Neill,
699 F.2d 1166, 1178–79 (1983) (Bork, J., concurring)).
27
Id.
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of Article III.” 28 The Court has always required that a litigant have
“standing”, which “subsumes a blend of constitutional requirements
and prudential considerations.” 29 Until a court determines that a
litigant has standing, “the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.” 30
For example, federal courts do not have jurisdiction to declare a statute
void unless matters before them involve “litigants in actual
controversies.” 31
The Supreme Court has established that in order to find that the
“irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” has been met, the
plaintiff must prove the three elements. 32 The first element, injury,
requires that the plaintiff have suffered “injury in fact”, which is “an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized . . . and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical.’” 33 The second element, causation, requires a causal
connection between the injury and the “conduct complained of.” 34 The
third element, redressability, requires that it must be likely, and not just
speculative, that the court can redress the injury. 35 The burden is on
the party invoking jurisdiction to establish the three elements. 36
While the Court has not yet addressed Article III standing in
connection to a data breach, several recent cases have had and will
have an impact on current and future data breach cases. In Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA, the Court found that plaintiffs lacked
standing in a case involving the federal government’s wiretapping
28

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982).
30
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)
(quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)).
31
Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration Comm’rs, 113 U.S. 33, 39
(1885).
32
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 179 (2000).
33
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 561.
36
Id.
29
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program. 37 The Court held that “threatened injury must be certainly
impending” in order to satisfy the injury in fact requirement. 38 Most
recently, in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Court held that the Ninth
Circuit had not properly analyzed the concreteness of a consumer’s
injury, one of the prongs of the injury in fact requirement, 39 and
otherwise urged that “bare procedural violation(s)” are likely not
enough to constitute injury in fact. 40 At the federal appellate court
level, data privacy, an implicit concern involved in assessing injuries
from a data breach, is currently up before the Sixth Circuit in a case
involving inaccurate information a credit reporting agency released to
a consumer’s potential employer. 41
The following sections will detail Supreme Court precedent on
Article III standing more generally followed by Article III standing in
lower court cases involving data breaches. The section on Supreme
Court precedent includes an analysis of Spokeo, which, though it was
decided after Remijas, did not substantively alter long-standing
principles of Article III standing, 42 and creates no conflict with the
Seventh Circuit’s analysis and holding in Remijas.
A. Article III Standing and Supreme Court Precedent
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court held that the
“irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” contains the
following three elements: (1) injury in fact, which is the invasion of a
legally protected interest which is both concrete and particularized and
actual or imminent; (2) “a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of”; and (3) likelihood that the injury can be
37

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013).
Id. at 1147.
39
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016).
40
Id. at 1544.
41
See Smith v. LexisNexis Screening Solutions, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 651 (E.D.
Mich. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 15-2330 (6th Cir. Nov. 2, 2015).
42
See, e.g., Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement at 2 n.1,
Chapman v. Dowman, Heintz, Boscia & Vician, P.C., No. 2:15-CV-120 JD, 2016
WL 3247872 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 29, 2015), at *1 n.1.
38
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redressed through a favorable decision. 43 For the purposes of
establishing standing at the pleading stage, “general factual allegations
of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice.” 44 The
plaintiff bears the burden of proof, and “each element must be
supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof.” 45
Plaintiffs in Lujan were wildlife conservation and environmental
organizations who sued the Secretary of the Interior and requested the
following: first, a declaratory judgment that an agency regulation was
in error as to its geographic scope, and second, an injunction requiring
that a new regulation be promulgated. 46 While the district court
granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the
Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that plaintiffs had
adequately pled injury in fact. 47
Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and
held that plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged an injury as a result of
the defendant’s actions. 48 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, urged
a higher threshold for standing and invalidated a congressional grant
of standing for the first time because of the absence of sufficient injury
in fact. 49 Injury in fact required more than a cognizable interest; it
required that the parties seeking review have themselves been
injured. 50 Plaintiffs argued that they had suffered injury in fact because
agency-funded projects would eliminate endangered species in
locations plaintiffs intended to visit, but these arguments “[did] not
support a finding of ‘actual or imminent’ injury that [Supreme Court]
43

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
Id. at 561.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 558–59.
47
Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals & Their Environment v. Hodel,
851 F.2d 1035, 1041 (8th Cir. 1988)
48
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562.
49
Seth F. Kreimer, “Spooky Action at a Distance”: Intangible Injury in Fact in
the Information Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 749-50 (2016).
50
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–63.
44
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cases require.” 51 The Court held that standing requires “a factual
showing of perceptible harm.” 52 Lujan emphasized that concreteness
is essential to the injury in fact requirement. 53
Shortly after Lujan was decided, the Supreme Court ruled
unanimously against the government in a case involving the IRS’s
allegedly illicit acquisition of tapes involving conversations between
the Church of Scientology members and its attorneys. 54 In that case,
the Los Angeles County Court Clerk released the tapes to the IRS,
which the IRS had requested in connection with an investigation into
the tax returns of L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church of
Scientology. 55 Given the physical delivery of the tapes, the United
States argued that the Church had “lost its claim to avoid a threatened
injury in fact.” 56 The Court held that the taxpayer was still suffering
injury as a result of the Government’s possession of the tapes in the
form of an “affront to the taxpayer’s privacy.” 57 Though the case was
centered on the question of mootness under Article III, not standing,
the case reveals that the Court found injury in fact where personal
information is concerned. This suggests that conferring standing for a
breach in which such information is stolen and subject to fraud, when
there is a strong possibility for future fraudulent conduct, is not
contrary to the Court’s holding.
More recently, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the
Court held that attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media
organizations did not have standing because they alleged future harm
that was not “certainly impending.” 58 The plaintiffs challenged the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of
51

Id. at 564.
Id. at 566.
53
Id. at 578.
54
Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S., 506 U.S. 9, 10 (1992).
55
Id.
56
Kreimer, supra note 49, at 760 (citing Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at
52

10).
57
58

Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 13.
133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013).
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2008, 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a), which permitted the Government to target
and surveil communications of non-U.S. citizens abroad. 59 Plaintiffs
regularly communicated with colleagues and clients abroad, and they
alleged that the new law forced them to undertake costly measures to
protect the confidentiality of their communications. 60 The Court held
that plaintiffs suffered self-inflicted injuries and “subjective fear of
surveillance,” neither of which gave rise to standing. 61 In its analysis,
the Court also rejected an alternative argument that present measures
taken to prevent future harm could constitute an injury sufficient to
confer standing. 62
The Court focused on an injury’s imminence, conceding that it
was “a somewhat elastic concept,” but that in order to satisfy the
element of imminence, the injury must be “certainly impending.” 63
Allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient to be considered
“certainly impending.” 64 The Court held that plaintiffs rested their
theory of standing on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities,”
including: (1) the Government would imminently target their
communications; (2) the Government would invoke its surveillance
authority under § 1881a; (3) Article III judges would approve the
Government’s surveillance plan; (4) the Government would intercept
communications from respondents’ contacts; and (5) the Government
would intercept respondents’ communications. 65 This “speculative
chain of possibilities” did not establish that injury based on future
surveillance was “certainly impending” or fairly traceable to section
1881(a). 66

59

Id. at 1144; 50 USCA § 1881a.
Id. at 1144-45.
61
Id. 1152–53.
62
Id. at 1143.
63
Id. at 1147 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61
(1992).
64
Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990).
65
Id. at 1148–50.
66
Id. at 1150.
60
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Plaintiffs also argued in the alternative that they were suffering
present injuries by taking measures to avoid section 1881(a)
surveillance. 67 The Court rejected this theory of standing as well,
holding that the Second Circuit had improperly “water[ed] down the
fundamental requirements of Article III” by allowing that the present
costs incurred by taking protective measures were sufficient for
standing as long as they were not “fanciful, paranoid, or otherwise
unreasonable.” 68
Justice Breyer wrote for the dissent and argued that the harm
alleged was not “speculative” and was “as likely to take place as are
most future events that commonsense inference and ordinary
knowledge of human nature tell us will happen.” 69 Given that all
agreed that interception of the phone calls or emails would qualify as
“concrete and particularized” injury, and a favorable judgment by the
Court would redress the injury by declaring the statute
unconstitutional, the principle issue was whether the interception of
the communications was an injury that was “actual or imminent.” 70
The dissent argued that the case law suggested that the Constitution
did not require that injury be an absolute certainty, but rather a
“reasonable” or “high probability.” 71 Notwithstanding their
disagreement, both the majority and dissent conceded that an actual
interception would constitute an injury sufficient to confer standing.
Though the Court did not find injury in fact in Clapper, the Court
has ruled in favor of plaintiffs whose “legitimate expectations of
privacy” have been violated. 72 Relevant cases involving intangible
acquisition of private information have created a potential Fourth
Amendment violation, including in cases involving thermal imaging,
67

Id.
Id. at 1151.
69
Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
70
Id. at 1155–56.
71
Id. at 1165.
72
Kreimer, supra note 49, at 758 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
353 (1967) (ruling that the “presence or absence of a physical intrusion” cannot be a
meaningful distinction in Fourth Amendment cases)).
68

156

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2016

11

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 11, Issue 2

Spring 2016

analysis of blood and urine samples, analysis of information in cell
phones seized upon arrest, and GPS monitoring. 73 Intangible
intrusions on privacy are enough to create constitutional violations,
and therefore, it is not unreasonable that the unquestioned theft of
personal information in a data breach may qualify as injurious enough
for the purposes of standing.
Finally, in its most recent term, the Court decided Spokeo, another
case involving concreteness and the injury in fact requirement. 74 In
Spokeo, the case before the Court involved an action brought by a
consumer under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) against a
website operator for publishing an inaccurate consumer report about
him. In a 6−2 decision, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision
and remanded, holding that the lower court’s standing analysis was
incomplete and had “failed to fully appreciate the distinction between
concreteness and particularization.” 75 The Court expressed no opinion
as to whether Robins had standing and remanded the question of the
concreteness of Robins’ injury to the Ninth Circuit.
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito stated that for an injury to
be “concrete” it must “actually exist[,]” 76 while also noting that an
injury need not be tangible to exist.77 The Court permitted that
procedural violations, such as a violation of the FCRA, might be
sufficient to constitute an injury in fact, but a “bare procedural
violation” such as “an incorrect zip code” would not cause concrete
harm. 78 The opinion has generated headlines, with both plaintiff and
defense bars claiming that the opinion was a positive one for their

73

Id. at 758 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Ferguson
v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473,
2489–90 n.1 (2014)).
74
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016).
75
Id. at 1550.
76
Id. at 1548.
77
Id. at 1549.
78
Id. at 1550.
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respective sides of the aisle. 79 Regardless of who benefited from
Spokeo, it does not create conflict for the Remijas holding, in which
the court adequately addressed both prongs of injury in fact, as the
discussion infra will demonstrate. While Spokeo does not provide any
additional guidance to cases with similar facts to Remijas, the cases
discussed in the next section, which deal with data breaches, or data
privacy, provide more insight into the correctness of the Remijas
court’s ruling.
B. Article III Standing and Data Breaches
Though no federal appellate court prior to the Remijas court has
ruled on any data breach cases which specifically involve fraudulent
charges, courts have dealt with data breaches and varying allegations
of injury. No case other than Remijas was decided after Clapper,
however, and therefore, only the Seventh Circuit had occasion to
interpret Clapper in a case involving a data breach. Other courts
primarily relied on the Supreme Court’s enunciation of Article III
standing in Lujan.
In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit addressed alleged injuries from
identity theft that resulted from a data breach in a case of first
impression. 80 The plaintiffs filed suit when a health care services
corporation was burgled and two laptops containing sensitive and
personal customer information was compromised. 81 Resnick v. Avmed,
Inc. was decided before Clapper, thus the court relied on Lujan, in
which the Supreme Court held that “general factual allegations of
injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice” to establish
standing. 82 Under that standard, the court quickly concluded that
79

Allison Grande, Spokeo Ruling Helps Both Sides of the Privacy Bar, Attys
Say, LAW360 (May 25, 2016),
http://www.law360.com/articles/800443/spokeo-ruling-helps-both-sides-of-privacybar-attys-say.
80
Resnick v. Avmed Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2012).
81
Id. at 1322.
82
Id. at 1323 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992)).
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allegations of actual identity theft and monetary damages were injury
in fact under the law. 83 Though the Seventh Circuit did not cite
Resnick in Remijas, 84 the Resnick court’s conclusion that identity theft
and monetary damages constituted injury in fact lends strength to the
idea that a data breach that results in fraudulent charges has similarly
pled an increased likelihood of identity theft and therefore injury in
fact.
In data breach cases before the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, both
courts held that plaintiffs had sufficiently pled injury in fact to satisfy
Article III standing. In Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp, plaintiffs
alleged that hackers who gained access to bank customers’ personal
information had caused injury in fact. The Seventh Circuit relied on
the reasoning of sister circuit courts 85 and held that injury in fact “can
be satisfied by a threat of future harm or by an act which harms the
plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm[,]” even if plaintiffs
provide no proof of data misuse. 86
In Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., the Ninth Circuit relied on slightly
different reasoning than the Seventh Circuit and held that if a plaintiff
faces a credible threat of harm that is real and immediate, and not
conjectural or hypothetical, then the plaintiff has met the injury in fact
requirement for Article III standing. 87 To formulate this test, the court
relied on Ninth Circuit precedent and a Supreme Court case, City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons. 88 In Krottner, a laptop was stolen from
Starbucks that contained the unencrypted personal information of
97,000 employees. 89 Following the theft, one of the plaintiffs was
83
84

Id.
See generally Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir.

2015).
85

Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 n.3 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing
to opinions in the Second, Sixth, Ninth and Fourth Circuits, in which the courts held
that threats of future harm conferred standing).
86
Id.
87
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010).
88
Id. (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Cent.
Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 947, 950 (9th Cir. 2002)).
89
Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1141.
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notified by his bank that someone had tried to open an account in his
name. 90 Plaintiffs enrolled in free credit monitoring services and spent
extra time monitoring their accounts. 91 Given these facts, the court
held that the theft created “real and immediate harm.” 92
In contrast, the Third Circuit ruled that data breach victims had
not successfully pled injuries sufficient to find Article III standing. 93 In
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., plaintiffs were employees of companies
which were customers of a payroll processing firm (Ceridian
Corporation). 94 A hacker infiltrated the company’s payment system
and “potentially gained access to personal and financial information”
of the company’s customer businesses. 95 Though there was a security
breach, the plaintiffs did not provide the court any proof that the
hacker “read, copied, or understood the data,” and the court held that
the allegations of future injury were therefore too hypothetical. 96 The
injuries alleged were even more speculative than those in Lujan, which
the Supreme Court held were insufficient to confer standing. 97 The
court also distinguished the facts from those in Krottner and Pisciotta,
finding that those cases involved “harms [that] were significantly more
‘imminent’ and ‘certainly impending’ than the alleged harm here.” 98
With Remijas, the Seventh Circuit relied on more recent Supreme
Court precedent, while adhering to the principles the cases above set
out regarding the injury in fact requirement. Per the holdings above,
in data breach cases, evidence that hackers have misused information
clearly makes a stronger case for conferring Article III standing.

90

Id.
Id.
92
Id. at 1143.
93
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41 (3d Cir. 2011).
94
Id. at 40.
95
Id. (emphasis added).
96
Id.
97
Id. at 42.
98
Id. at 44.
91
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REMIJAS V. NEIMAN MARCUS
A. Factual Background
Neiman Marcus, a luxury department store, was attacked by
hackers who stole customers’ credit card numbers during the holiday
season in 2013. 99 In December 2013, Neiman Marcus determined that
as a result of the hack, some customers had fraudulent charges on their
credit cards. 100 Once Neiman Marcus learned of the fraudulent
charges, the company investigated and found potential malware in its
computer systems, which had attempted to collect customer card data
between July 16, 2013 and October 30, 2013. 101 The company
announced on January 10, 2014, that it had determined that
approximately 350,000 credit cards had been exposed to the hackers’
malware. 102 Neiman Marcus then publicly disclosed the data breach
and revealed that of those 350,000, 9200 cards were known to have
been used fraudulently. 103 Not only were credit card numbers exposed,
but also social security numbers and birth dates. 104 Neiman Marcus
was not the only company to suffer security breaches during that
holiday season. 105
Neiman Marcus notified its customers who had shopped at its
stores between January 2013 and January 2014 and offered them “one
year of free credit monitoring and identify theft protection.” 106
Following this announcement, on February 4, 2014, Michael Kingston,
99

Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 689 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 689–90.
101
Id. at 690.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Target and Michael’s were also targeted. See Christopher Budd,
Information about recent retail data breaches in the United States: an FAQ, TREND
MICRO: SIMPLY SECURITY, (last visited April 19, 2016),
http://blog.trendmicro.com/information-recent-retail-data-breaches-united-statesfaq/.
106
Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690.
100
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Senior Vice President and Chief Information Officer, testified before
the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, representing that the
information that appeared to have been compromised was credit card
information, with no indication that social security numbers or other
private information had been compromised. 107 Several lawsuits were
filed, and these were consolidated into the complaint that gave rise to
this case, Remijas v. Neiman Marcus.
In the complaint, Hilary Remijas alleged that she made purchases
at the Neiman Marcus in Oak Brook, Illinois, in August 2013 and
December 2013. 108 Melissa Frank, another named plaintiff, alleged
that she used a joint debit card to make purchases at the Neiman
Marcus in Long Island, New York in December 2013. 109 Frank further
alleged that she was a target of a scam through her cell phone and that
her husband had received a letter about the breach from Neiman
Marcus. 110 The final named plaintiff, Joanne Kao, alleged that she
made purchases on ten separate occasions over the course of 2013 at a
Neiman Marcus store location in San Francisco, and that she received
notifications about the breach from both Neiman Marcus and her
bank. 111
B. Procedural Background
Hilary Remijas joined several other plaintiffs to file a class-action
complaint against Neiman Marcus on June 2, 2014, seeking to
represent themselves and the 350,000 other customers whose personal
information may have been hacked. 112 The complaint relies on
theories for relief that include “negligence, breach of implied contract,
unjust enrichment, unfair and deceptive business practices, invasion of
107

Id.
Id. at 691.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 690; Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, No. 14 C 1735, 2014
WL 4627893, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2014).
108
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privacy, and violation of multiple state data breach laws.” 113
Defendant, Neiman Marcus, moved to dismiss the complaint under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of
standing and failure to state a claim. 114 The District Court granted the
motion to dismiss on standing grounds. 115
C. The District Court’s Decision
District Judge Zagel analyzed the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries and
held that plaintiffs had failed to plead Article III standing sufficiently.
He noted that Article III standing is not “a mere pleading
requirement,” but rather must be supported “with the manner and
degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
litigation.” 116 Plaintiffs alleged four principle categories of injury, and
Judge Zagel was unpersuaded that any sufficiently supported Article
III standing. 117
The first principle category of injury that Plaintiffs alleged was
increased risk of future harm. 118 Judge Zagel relied on three different
cases where the court had previously addressed Article III standing in
the context of cyber-attacks and analyzed how they interpreted the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Clapper. 119 The courts in two
previous cases, Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc. 120 and In Re
Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litigation121 held that “the alleged increased
risk of future harm was insufficient to establish standing.” 122 The
113

Id. at 690–91.
Id. at 691.
115
Id.
116
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, No. 14 C 1735, 2014 WL
4627893, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2014).
117
Id. at *5.
118
Id. at *2.
119
Id.
120
No. 12 C 09115, 2014 WL 960816 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014).
121
No. 12–cv–8617, 2013 WL 4759588 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013).
122
Remijas, 2014 WL 4627893, at *2.
114
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Strautins and Barnes & Noble court both relied on Clapper, which
required “certainly impending” analysis with regard to the injury in
fact element of standing. 123 The Strautins court also argued that
Clapper overruled previous Seventh Circuit precedent, which held that
the “the injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a threat of future
harm or by an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk
of future harm that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the
defendant’s actions.” 124
In another case, the alleged increased risk of future harm was
sufficient to establish Article III standing. 125 In Moyer v. Michael
Stores, Inc., the court found that while Clapper established a
heightened standard for standing analysis, such a standard was only
appropriate for situations that called for more rigor—namely, national
security and the Constitution. 126 The court concluded that Clapper and
Pisciotta could co-exist. 127
Judge Zagel noted that while a literal reading of Pisciotta might
lead to the conclusion that any increase in risk of future harm would
be sufficient to confer Article III standing, this was an improper
reading. 128 The standing threshold was therefore somewhere in the
middle, requiring more than a mere increase of risk of harm, but less
than Clapper’s heightened standard. Regarding the facts, Judge Zagel
differentiated Pisciotta from Strautins and Barnes & Noble, as the
plaintiffs’ data in Pisciotta was actually stolen, while the data in the
latter two cases was only alleged to have possibly been stolen. 129
Given that the data in Pisciotta was actually stolen, Judge Zagel
argued that the Pisciotta court’s holding satisfied the “certainly
123
124

Id.
Id. (citing Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.2d 629, 634 (7th Cir.

2007)).
125

Moyer v. Michael Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 WL 3511500 at *4–5
(N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014).
126
Id.
127
Id. at *2 (citing Moyer, 2014 WL 3511500, at *6).
128
Id.
129
Id. at *3.
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impending” standard, while Strautins and Barnes & Noble, where data
was only possible stolen, did not satisfy the standard. 130
Applying this understanding to Remijas, Judge Zagel held that the
majority of Plaintiffs were only alleging that their data may have been
stolen, which made the case more like Strautins and Barnes &
Noble. 131 Though Plaintiffs also alleged that 9200 of the 350,000
customers had fraudulent charges appear on their credit cards, Judge
Zagel held that this was not enough to prove an injury to confer
standing. 132 Judge Zagel determined that the fraudulent charges led to
several inferences: (1) there was injury in fact, which could be inferred
from the fact that 9200 customers had their data stolen, and (2) there
was injury in fact that was “certainly impending” for the remaining
customers among the 350,000, who might experience fraudulent
charges in the future. 133 Relying on Clapper, neither inference
demonstrated injury that was “concrete, particularized, and, if not
actual, at least imminent.” 134 While Judge Zagel found that potential
future fraudulent charges were sufficiently “imminent” for standing,
the injuries were not sufficiently concrete. 135 Plaintiffs who suffered
fraudulent charges did not allege that they were unreimbursed, and
therefore the charges for which plaintiffs were not financially
responsible did not qualify as “concrete” injuries. 136
Additionally, Judge Zagel was not persuaded that the customers
were at a “certainly impending risk of identity theft.” The fact that
9200 Plaintiffs had incurred fraudulent charges on their credit cards
only supported an inference that their credit card information was
stolen. 137 While this placed the remaining Plaintiffs at a “certainly
impending” risk of incurring fraudulent charges themselves, Judge
130

Id.
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
131
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Zagel held that this did not render Plaintiffs at “certainly impending”
risk of suffering future identity theft. 138
Judge Zagel dispensed with the Plaintiffs’ other alleged injuries,
finding none of them to be sufficient to confer standing. 139 Plaintiffs
alleged that time and money allegedly spent to mitigate risk of future
fraudulent charges and identity theft constituted injury that conferred
standing. 140 Citing Moyer, Judge Zagel noted that the costs of
guarding against a risked future injury only confer standing when the
underlying injury the plaintiff is trying to avoid “is itself a cognizable
Article III injury.” 141 Judge Zagel argued that the allegations regarding
what was done to mitigate future risk were insufficient, and the steps
normally taken when fraudulent charges appear (reimbursement and
new card issuance) don’t rise above a de minimis injury. 142 Further,
Judge Zagel reiterated that the complaint did not adequately allege the
risk of identity theft that was sufficiently imminent, and therefore, the
efforts to mitigate are not cognizable Article III injuries. 143
Plaintiffs also claimed that they suffered injury in that they paid a
premium purchase price for retail goods at the Defendant’s stores, a
portion of which the Defendant was required to use for data breach
protection services. 144 In other words, the Plaintiffs’ theory was
because they overpaid, they suffered financial injuries. 145 Judge Zagel
held that Plaintiffs relied on case law that found injury when the valuereducing injury was “intrinsic to the product at issue.” 146 Here,

138

Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *4–5.
140
Id. at *4.
141
Id. (citing Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 WL
3511500, at *4 n.1 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014)).
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
139
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however, “the deficiency complained of is extrinsic to the product”
and therefore is a meaningless theory of injury. 147
Finally, Judge Zagel addressed Plaintiffs’ alleged injury due to
“loss of control over and value of their private information.” 148 Citing
Barnes & Noble, Judge Zagel held that the injury as pled was not
sufficiently concrete. 149
D. The Seventh Circuit’s Decision
Chief Judge Wood, joined by Judge Kanne and Judge Tinder,
reversed the District Court’s decision, finding that the plaintiffs had
plausibly alleged Article III standing. 150 The case was reviewed de
novo, consistent with the court’s precedent. 151 The court analyzed both
the requirements of Article III standing and, more briefly, Neiman
Marcus’s argument that the complaint should be dismissed for failure
to state a claim. 152
The court addressed the Plaintiffs’ imminent and actual injuries as
pled. 153 The two imminent injuries included: first, an increased risk of
future fraudulent charges and second, greater susceptibility to identity
theft. The four actual injuries included:
1) lost time and money resolving the fraudulent charges, 2)
lost time and money protecting themselves against future
identity theft, 3) the financial loss of buying items at Neiman
Marcus that they would not have purchased had they known
147

Id. at *5.
Id.
149
Id. at *5 (citing In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litigation, No. 12–cv–8617,
2013 WL 4759588, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013) (finding no actual injury where
plaintiffs did not allege that their personal information was sold or that the plaintiffs
themselves could have sold it)).
150
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2015).
151
Id. at 691 (citing Reid L. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 358 F.3d 511, 515 (7th
Cir. 2004)).
152
Id. at 692.
153
Id.
148
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of the store’s careless approach to cybersecurity, and 4) lost
control over the value of their personal information. 154
With regard to Plaintiffs’ four alleged injuries, Chief Judge Wood
noted that the allegations went “far beyond” allegations in Spokeo,
therefore differentiating the injuries alleged here from the injuries
alleged to have resulted from the publication of inaccurate information
on a website. 155
The Seventh Circuit, relying on Supreme Court precedent in
Clapper, noted that Article III standing requires that the injury have
already occurred or be “certainly impending.” 156 Chief Judge Wood
summarized the injuries alleged: that each Plaintiff’s personal data had
been stolen; that, of the 350,000 customers, 9200 incurred fraudulent
charges and experienced harm; that the 9200 suffered the “aggravation
and loss of value of the time needed to set things straight”; and that the
remaining customers suffered a concrete risk of similar harm. 157 Chief
Judge Wood identified the question as whether one of the following
conditions was met under Clapper: either the harm had already
occurred, or it was “certainly impending.” 158
Disagreeing with the district court’s interpretation of Clapper’s
precedent, Chief Judge Wood held that Clapper did not “foreclose any
use whatsoever of future injuries to support Article III standing.” 159
With Clapper, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff human rights
organizations did not have standing to challenge the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act because plaintiffs only suspected that
interceptions of their communications with suspected terrorists might
have occurred, not that any such interceptions did occur. 160 These
suspicions were too speculative for the purposes of establishing Article
154

Id.
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 693.
160
Id.
155

168

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2016

23

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 11, Issue 2

Spring 2016

III standing. 161 Chief Judge Wood went on to quote Clapper, clarifying
that plaintiffs are not charged with demonstrating that they are
“literally certain that the harms they identify will come about . . . [and]
we have found standing based on a ‘substantial risk’ that harm will
occur, which may prompt plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs to
mitigate or avoid that harm.” 162
Chief Judge Wood cited to another district court that found that
substantial risk sufficed for Article III standing in a data breach case in
which that court held that “the risk that Plaintiffs’ personal data will be
misused by the hackers who breached Adobe’s network is immediate
and very real.” 163 Unlike in Clapper, where plaintiffs could only
speculate as to whether their communications had been intercepted,
here the plaintiffs’ information was stolen. 164 Chief Judge Wood
argued that Plaintiffs here should not have to wait for hackers to act on
their personal information, either by running up fraudulent charges on
their credit cards or by committing identity theft. 165
Chief Judge Wood further argued that the very fact of the hack
made it plausible to infer that Plaintiffs had shown a substantial risk of
harm, as it was reasonably assumed that the purpose of the hack was
“to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’ identities.” 166
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S FINDING OF ARTICLE III STANDING COMPORTS
WITH PRECEDENT AND CONSISTENCY
The Seventh Circuit rested its opinion on a clear distinction
between the facts in Remijas and Clapper. In Clapper, the Supreme
Court held that possible future injuries did not satisfy the “certainly
161
162

Id.
Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5

(2013)).
163

Id. (citing In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014)).
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
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impending” standard required to insure that injuries are not too
speculative for Article III purposes. 167 The Seventh Circuit held that
the district court had both misapplied Clapper and improperly read out
the idea that “substantial risk” of future injury was also available to
support standing. 168 Indeed, just one year after Clapper, the Supreme
Court held that an allegation of future injury could suffice if the
threatened injury was “certainly impending” or there was a
“substantial risk” that harm would occur in the future. 169 Therefore,
there is no question that the substantial risk standard that the Seventh
Circuit used to assess injury in fact as alleged in Remijas was
appropriate.
While multiple federal appellate courts have addressed data
breaches, including the Eleventh, Ninth, Third, and First Circuits, only
the Seventh Circuit has applied Clapper in a data breach case. The
Seventh Circuit recently applied its own precedent in Lewert v. P.F.
Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., a case in which the plaintiffs alleged future
and present injuries following a computer system breach in which
consumer credit card information was stolen. 170 The Seventh Circuit
held that increased risk of fraudulent charges and identity theft were
plausible future injuries because the data had already been stolen. 171
The plaintiffs also successfully alleged present injuries, including
fraudulent charges, and time and effort mitigating charges and
preventing future fraud. 172
In a recent data breach case at the district court level, the District
Court of Maryland argued that courts generally find that the increased
risk of identity theft without evidence of actual theft of personal

167

Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147.
Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.
169
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (citing
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147, 1150 n.5).
170
No. 14–3700, 2016 WL 1459226 at *1 (7th Cir. 2016).
171
Id. at *3.
172
Id.
168

170

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2016

25

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 11, Issue 2

Spring 2016

information does not confer standing. 173 The court cited to Remijas
and Krottner as examples of cases in which the facts supported
standing, because “allegations included either actual examples of the
use of the fruits of the data breach for identity theft, even if involving
victims other than the named plaintiffs, or a clear indication that the
data breach was for the purpose of using the plaintiffs' personal data to
engage in identity fraud.” 174 The majority of district courts have found
no standing in the absence of specific incidents or evidence of intent to
use stolen information. 175 Remijas therefore fits well within the
majority approach.
Future implications of the above-discussed approach are great as
data breaches continue to occur, and more lawsuits follow. In March
2016, a student filed a class action lawsuit against the University of
Central Florida, alleging negligence that allowed hackers to store
personal information of more than 60,000 students and faculty. 176 Had
the plaintiffs alleged identity theft, per Eleventh Circuit precedent, the
plaintiffs could have successfully alleged Article III standing. 177 This
case was voluntarily dismissed, 178 but such cases are likely to continue
to arise, as personally identifiable information is increasingly stored
online by schools, employers, hospitals, and other goods and services
providers with varying degrees of protection.
Remijas also fits well within Spokeo, which reiterated that
concreteness is an essential element of the injury in fact requirement.
Spokeo has raised numerous questions for litigants regarding how
statutorily created harms interact with Article III standing, but the
Court did not disturb precedent regarding concreteness. Per Spokeo, an
173

Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health System, No. TDC-15-2125, 2016 WL
2946165, *9 (D. Md. May 19, 2016).
174
Id. at *4.
175
In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp.3d 949, 955 (D. Nev. 2015) (listing
post-Clapper cases).
176
Complaint, Heller v. Univ. of Cent. Fla. Bd. of Trs., No. 6:16-cv-396, 2016
WL 887470 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2016).
177
See Resnick v. Avmed Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2012).
178
Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice, Heller v. Univ. of Cent.
Fla. Bd. of Trs., No. 6:16-cv-396, 2016 WL 887470 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2016).

171

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol11/iss2/3

26

Linehan: Is the Injury Real?: The Seventh Circuit Extends Article III Stan

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 11, Issue 2

Spring 2016

injury need not be tangible to be concrete, 179 which is critical for data
breach victims, whose injuries will generally be intangible.
Several federal appellate courts have dealt with Spokeo in recent
decisions, scrutinizing plaintiffs’ alleged harms more closely. In
Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
drew a distinction between bare procedural harms and harms like those
suffered by data breach victims and noted that the plaintiffs had
asserted only “a bare violation of the requirements of D.C. law[,]” as
opposed to “any invasion of privacy, increased risk of fraud or identity
theft.” 180 In a case involving alleged violations of disclosure
requirements of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the plaintiff had satisfied Article III standing
requirements, as the harms she alleged were intangible but “real.” 181
These opinions make clear that Remijas did not overreach or
overextend Article III standing and was correctly decided.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on a case in which actual fraud
has occurred in the wake of a data breach. Given the standards
articulated for Article III standing, requiring that injuries be “certainly
impending” and sufficiently concrete, the Seventh Circuit’s recent
opinion in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus, LLC was correctly reached. The
Seventh Circuit followed Supreme Court reasoning on Article III
standing to find that actual injury had been sufficiently alleged in
Remijas. When faced with similar facts, other federal courts of appeal
should adopt this approach and find that fraudulent activity following
a data breach constitutes injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III
standing. In cases where data breaches do not result in any known
179

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., No. 14-7047, 2016 WL 3996710, at *6-7
(D.C. Cir. July 26, 2016) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo thus closes the
door on [plaintiffs’] claim that the Stores’ mere request for a zip code, standing
alone, amounted to an Article III injury.”)
181
Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., No. 15-15708, 2016 WL 3611543 at *9
(11th Cir. July 6, 2016).
180
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fraudulent activity, and where plaintiffs are unsure if the information
was used at all, Remijas is likely to be less helpful for plaintiffs. With
Remijas, the Seventh Circuit merely recognized that fraudulent
activity makes identity theft and future fraudulent charges more likely,
removing a single, but critical, barrier for plaintiffs seeking relief in
court.
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